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Last Wednesday, Vienna hosted a meeting of Balkan
countries involving Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, FYROM,
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia in divisive move that
deliberately excluded the Greek government from decisions
concerning the tackling of the mounting refugee crisis in
Europe’s borders. On Monday, FYROM had already previously
decided to deny entry to Afghan migrants and restricted access
to Syrians and Iraqis. Greek authorities summoned the
Austrian ambassador to protest against the Vienna meeting,
which they described as a ‘unilateral move which is not at all
friendly toward our country’. The day after the meeting, the
Greek Prime Minister proclaimed that Greece will not be
turned into a ‘warehouse of souls’  and just today, in an
unprecedented move, he recalled the Greek ambassador in
Vienna. In the meantime, the situation in Greece is rapidly
spiraling out of hand. The images of desperate refugees
roaming the Greek highways and heading for Greece’s northern borders are shocking suggesting that the situation
might soon become unmanageable.
What Europe has witnessed the past few days on a diplomatic level is simply the first serious shocks of a long-
brewing crisis that has its origins in a complicated series of diplomatic failures and mismanagement by some and
deliberate war-mongering by others. Europe is paying a hard price for something she didn’t directly cause, yet
nevertheless tolerated, as part of a ruthless geopolitical game that has its epicenter in the Syrian crisis and the
broader Middle East antagonisms. The civil war in Syria broke out, and was portrayed as such by Western media,
as a rebellion against the oppression and brutality of the Assad regime. What of course was never openly admitted
(but is nevertheless a common secret) was that this is a war that some of the major players in the region -the US,
Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia- not only welcomed but in varying degrees deliberately fomented in an effort to
dismantle the Hezbollah-Syria-Iran axis due to which Israel paid a heavy price in the 2006 war in Lebanon. Russia’s
active involvement in the conflict last October with the commencement of the bombing campaign was rightly
perceived by many as an effort to tilt the balance in favour of the crumbling Assad regime. Yet, apart from restoring
the internal dynamics of the conflict, it was also a move that served wider Russian objectives. The continuation of
the Syrian civil war causes internal division among EU members as the flow of Syrian refugees wreaks havoc in the
European borders and keeps Europe in disarray. EU’s weakening status as a diplomatic power is not a meager gain
for Russia as it finds itself less pressured on the Ukrainian front and makes Europeans more pliable to Russian
demands.
On the other hand, as long as the conflict keeps Hezbollah’s forces occupied, the Syrian regime weak and Russia
overextended, the US, Saudi Arabia and Israel are also content with the continuation of the Syrian conflict which
means that any prospect for a resolution of the root cause of the refugee crisis is not on the map. That also partly
explains the vehemence and lack of diplomatic etiquette in the European member states’ reactions. They are very
well aware that the ‘hot potato’ is dropped on their front door while they themselves have no real say in the
resolution of the conflict apart from the management of its consequences. In other words, Europe is hopelessly
toothless in a geopolitical crisis in which it absorbs most of the heat. As a result, the dramatic events that were
unleashed since last summer (when the influx of refugees through the Greek borders took unprecedented
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dimensions) have not only revealed the cracks and fissures in Europe’s integration experiment. It has also exposed
the hypocrisy at the roots of Europe’s so-called soft power: its alleged humanitarian sensitivity and the values of
hospitality, tolerance, openness and cosmopolitan solidarity that have routinely inspired and decorated its official
declarations.
Apart from being highly volatile and unpredictable as a whole, the ongoing crisis is also imminently threatening the
Eurozone’s stability. The Greek government is currently under assessment according to the terms of the 3rd bail-out
agreement and it seems once more unable or unwilling to deliver. Europe’s patience with successive Greek
governments has been very generous, partly due to geopolitical reasons, but it is gradually becoming common
knowledge that the Greek situation is probably unsolvable within the Euro. Given the enormous pressure that the
refugee crisis is going to exert on European societies in the immediate future it is doubtful whether further tolerance
and further fiscal injections are going to be extended to Greece in the near future. What would result from a Grexit at
this juncture is relatively unpredictable although it is certain that the Americans are expected to do their best to
prevent it. The difference this time is that in view of the future cost of adjustments involved in the tackling of the
refugee crisis it might prove tougher, if not impossible, to convince Germany to keep carrying the bill of an
insubordinate and erratic member (either by turning a blind eye to the current assessment or agreeing to a 4th bail-
out programme). The glooming prospect of a Greek state geopolitical collapse is not an entirely unlikely scenario if
immediate steps are not taken to interrupt or ease the flow of refugees at the Greek-Turkish borders in the Aegean.
The current situation, there, is however even further complicated by Turkey’s adventurous foreign policy trying to
extract geopolitical gains from NATO’s recent involvement. Apart from her dubious role in the Syrian conflict, Turkey
has actively pursued an exploitative tactic in the negotiations for limiting current migration flows in the Aegean. The
EU strategic objective was to cajole Turkey into actively curbing migration flows by offering a generous international
monitoring scheme. Turkey has managed to turn her involvement into an opportunity to promote her long-term
geopolitical aims in the Aegean. After stalling the operation of the recently mandated NATO mission, Turkey insisted
that the latter should not operate in the southern Aegean: ‘Turkey disputes the sea border between its southern
coast and the Dodecanese islands in Greece, hence it wants to avoid this border being implicitly recognised in the
operational plan of a NATO mission’. As a result, it is highly improbable that immigration flows will be seriously
diverted or reduced since the current state of affairs is serving Turkish interests on multiple fronts (or at least so
Erdogan seems to believe): by recording Turkish demands in the border dispute with Greece and by putting
pressure on the European Union and the US to intervene in Syria in favour of Turkey’s strategic interests and
abandon their Kurdish allies who are by the way the only forces seriously opposing ISIS in northern Syria.
If all this sounds crazy, cynical and unimaginably entangled, welcome to the international politics of the 21st century.
Unlike what Fukuyama had predicted in the idyllic ambiance of the early ‘90s, history is not only back but viciously
upon us.
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